

November 2021

Home Office

Protect Duty Consultation

Summary of consultation responses

Report

Ipsos MORI

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Executive Summary

This section summarises the main themes which emerged from the consultation on a section by section basis. As such, it presents an overview of the most pertinent points rather than an exhaustive summary of each and every issue.

Profile of consultation participants

Overall, the online consultation form was completed 2264 times, alongside 491 email responses¹. The table below shows how the response rates are broken down by different participant types.

Response method	Non-stakeholder responses (e.g. public/organisations)	Stakeholder responses	Campaign responses	TOTAL
Online response forms	1,785	479	0	2,264
Email	195	0	296	491
TOTAL	1,980	479	296	2,755

It should be noted that not every participant responded to every question in the consultation – the analysis in this summary also provides the balance of responses as a proportion of the number on a per question basis, which is likely to vary from the total participant figures above.

Section 1 – Who (or where) should legislation apply to?

- **Most participants agreed that venues and organisations owning, operating or responsible for Publicly Accessible Locations should take appropriate and proportionate measures to protect the public from attacks.** Around seven in ten of those who responded (1,664 out of 2,345) agreed or strongly agreed. Participants also made suggestions for the type of venues and places where the Duty should apply. The most mentioned locations were all Publicly Accessible Locations (53), all organisations/venues/irrespective of the size (32), all venues of large gatherings (31), places of worship/religious institutions (31), all organisations/venues (26) and private venues (20).
- **The majority of those that responded felt that venue capacity should determine whether a Duty should be applied or not.** Half (1,267 out of 2,388) thought capacity should be the main criteria, whilst significantly fewer participants thought that staffing levels (292) or annual revenue (166) would be the best determinants. Participants were then asked to suggest appropriate size thresholds for inclusion in the scope of the Duty and the most mentioned opinion was that all organisations should be within the scope of a Protect Duty regardless of their size (664 out of 2348).
- **Most participants agreed that venues and organisations owning, operating or responsible for Publicly Accessible Locations should prepare their staff to respond appropriately in the event of a terrorist attack.** Around seven in ten agreed with this (1,655 out of 2345), whilst around twice as many participants (1,578 out of 2349) also felt that it was appropriate for owners and operators to consider security and implement appropriate mitigations compared to those who disagreed (771).

¹ There were 4,225 'partial' responses to the consultation which were omitted from analysis. These participants did not complete and formally submit their response form meaning they did not provide consent to participating.

- **There was strong agreement that parties should work together where there is a shared organisational responsibility for a venue.** A majority of 979 out of 1,198 thought this was appropriate. Furthermore, 711 out of 763 (who own or run a Publicly Accessible Location) believed that they are aware of their organisations' classification and whether it falls within the scope of the definition of a Publicly Accessible Location.
- **The majority of participants didn't think there should be other exemptions from a Protect Duty (excluding those listed in Annex 1).** Out of 2,340 who responded, 1,347 did not think there should be other exemptions, however two in five responding to this question (993) did think there should be.

Section 2 – What should the requirements be?

- **Accountability was considered to be a cornerstone of the Duty.** This predominantly referred to the need for clear roles and responsibilities, particularly amongst event organisers and those at senior level within the venues and organisers.
- **About the same amount said their organisation produced a risk assessment (540) as those who did not (543).** The majority of organisations which conduct risk assessments review them at least once a year, with less than half (400 out of 977) reviewing them multiple times a year.
- **The most commonly mentioned mitigations against terrorism were liaison with police or other resource on threats and appropriate security measures, working to ensure security behaviours are adopted by workforces, staff training to raise awareness of the threat and ensuring evacuation procedures that are in place are understood by staff.** In terms of existing activities and mechanisms which result in the best protective security and organisational preparedness, the most common responses were staff awareness raising, training courses and communication campaigns. Regarding the best existing local authority functions, the most mentioned were Health and Safety, fire safety, building control processes, Safety Advisory Groups and Community Safety Partnerships.
- **There were slightly more participants who opposed (759) a legislative requirement for local authorities and other local partners to develop a strategic plan, than those who supported it (652).** Despite this, the vast majority of participants thought that local government was best placed to bring together partnerships (620). Out of a total of 1,631 participants, 977 were supportive of the requirement of relevant organisations to join in partnership to achieve security outcomes.
- **Where there is current Government security advice, most (872 out of 1,351) believe it would be appropriate for this guidance to become legislative under Protect Duty.** More participants (844) also thought it would be reasonable for businesses and other operators to be mandated to follow Protect Duty, compared to 296 who opposed.
- **When asked how organisations who work at public spaces could be encouraged or required to engage with partner organisations the most common themes were to encourage engagement with the police (195) and to make engagement mandatory/legislate it (180).** Other issues mentioned included to improve collaboration/coordination/joined up working (130), convene local meetings/forums (129) and training/education (118).

Section 3 – How should compliance work?

- **Participants were split almost equally between those which supported an inspection regime (194) and those who opposed it (191).** Suggestions on how a compliance regime could operate included: training (115), regular visits/inspections (104), audits (65), penalties/punishments for non-compliance (64).
- **Overall, opinion towards the use of fines for non-compliance was relatively split with 517 supporting civil penalties and 547 opposing them.** Reasons for supporting the use of fines included: increase in compliance, the feeling that civil penalties are necessary and overdue, the increase in accountability of venues and organisations, the perceived fairness of such penalties and ultimately the measure would lead to an improvement in public safety and security. Reasons for opposing the civil penalty proposal included: not needed and/or unfair, the definition of 'reasonable steps' was ambiguous and unclear, the need to exclude some types of venues and organisations, the challenges associated costs to enforce and the potential for it to be counter-productive (and ultimately not lead to improved compliance).

Section 4 – How should Government best support and work with partners?

- **The most common suggestions for useful measures to help comply with a Protect Duty were a digital service where you could access relevant material (806), a risk assessment template (795).** Other themes mentioned included the need for information on undertaking a risk assessment for terrorism threats (671), easy to digest information regarding threat and attack methodologies (667), advice on what constitutes reasonably practicable and appropriate mitigations for my circumstances (657) and staff training and awareness courses (654).
- **In terms of the advice and support required for organisations within the scope of Protect Duty, the most commonly raised themes were ensuring advice and support is bespoke and not 'one size fits all'.** The need for clarity and the importance of effective engagement and communication were commonly mentioned. Participants also highlighted the need to involve security experts when it comes to providing advice and guidance.
- **In terms of what the Government could do to support partners in the delivery of Protect Duty, the main support identified was the need for Government to provide funding and resources.**
- **Of those participants who own/operate a Publicly Accessible Location (1,083) there were more who said they did access Government advice regarding threat, protective security, and preparedness (599) than those who said they did not (484).** The two main reasons for not accessing Government advice and guidance included not knowing it existed (217) and not thinking they needed to address the threat (200). There were other, less commonly mentioned reasons, such as the lack of time to access the information (74) and it being too confusing to find what they want (34).
- **With regards to accessing counter-terrorism information and working with local partners in the future, one of the key themes emerging from responses was that participants see a combination of groups, meetings and forums as central to success.**

- **Almost four in five participants responding (1,822) said they would access counter terrorism information if the proposed service was available to them, while just over one in five (519) said they would not.** Publicly Accessible Location owners, operators, or those responsible for security at a Publicly Accessible Location who also stated they would access counter terrorism information (1,083) were most likely to use this service to get general updates on changing terrorism risk (735), to understand what risk management activities you need to do (709) and to access counter terrorism training (600).
- **A total of 802 participants made comments in support of local business partnerships having a role in supporting organisations and venues to deliver improved security.** There were 116 participants who left opposing comments.
- Participants were asked what they thought the Government should consider in order to support the provision of high-quality advice and guidance from private sector security professionals providing counter-terrorism security advice. The most commonly selected option amongst participants was for the Government to consider implementing its own supported standards for counter-terrorism risk assessments and advice (622), followed by accredited training for individual professionals (579), regulation of counter-terrorism consultants (475), and Government supported 'approved contractors' (475).
- Suggestions for Government incentives to encourage parties to take forward security considerations and measures included the provision of advice and information, better engagement and communication and increased collaboration and coordination.

Introduction, context and methodology

Background to the consultation

The purpose of the Protect Duty consultation was to consider how Government can work together with private and public sector partners to develop proportionate security measures to improve public security and to counter terrorism. It also considered how those responsible for Publicly Accessible Locations (Publicly Accessible Locations) (any place to which the public or any section of the public has access, on payment or otherwise, as of right or by virtue of express or implied permission) are ready and prepared to take appropriate action in the event that a terrorist attack was to happen.

With some exceptions (e.g. for transport security and for certain sports grounds), there is no specific legislative requirement to consider or implement security measures at Publicly Accessible Locations. However, there are many reasonable and appropriate measures which can be - and often already are - undertaken by organisations who operate at such locations. Legislation would need to carefully balance the need to ensure effective consideration of public security, and the implementation of reasonable security measures, against the impacts on organisations in scope.

Purpose of the consultation

The purpose of the Protect Duty consultation was to seek views from all parties that a 'Protect Duty' would potentially affect. This particularly applies to organisations which own locations or operate at Publicly Accessible Locations.

The responses to the consultation questions and additional research and analysis will be used by the Home Office to develop a Regulatory Impact Assessment.

The consultation period ran from 26 February 2021 to 2 July 2021.

Participation channels

There were four thematic sections to the consultation, including both mandatory and optional questions. Out of a total of 58 questions, 31 were open-ended, 24 were fixed responses and 3 were open numerical. There were a number of different response channels set up by the Home Office to enable participants to submit their response and any accompanying evidence:

1. Online by responding to the questionnaire, which was hosted by the Home Office
2. Via email² or
3. Via post³.

The Protect Duty consultation page⁴ hosted a Consultation Document, which contained the details of the Government's proposals and associated issues. This was available for all to access prior to submitting a response.

² ProtectDuty@homeoffice.gov.uk

³ Protect Duty Consultation, Protect and Prepare, 5th Floor NE, Peel Building, Office for Security and Counter-terrorism, Home Office, 2 Marsham Street, London, SW1P 4DF

⁴ <https://www.gov.uk/Government/consultations/protect-duty>

Receipt and handling of responses

As outlined above all responses were submitted via one of the three participation channels to the Home Office. These responses were then transferred directly to Ipsos MORI via a secure transfer portal. All original electronic responses were securely filed, catalogued, and given a serial number for future reference, in line with requirements of the Data Protection Act (2018), and General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR).

During the consultation period, the Home Office received 491 email responses (i.e. not using the official consultation response form format). After the consultation deadline these were then transferred securely to Ipsos MORI via the same method. The handling of consultation responses was subject to a rigorous process of checking, logging, and confirmation to ensure a full audit trail.

Response rates

Overall, the online consultation form was completed 2,264 times, alongside 491 email responses⁵.

The table below shows how the response rates are broken down by different participant types.

Response method	Non-stakeholder responses (e.g. public/organisations)	Stakeholder responses (organisations)	Campaign responses ⁶	TOTAL
Online response forms	1,785	479	0	2,264
Email	195	0	296	491
TOTAL	1,980	479	296	2,755

A full list of stakeholders can be found in Appendix D which is contained under a separate cover.

Purpose of the report

This report presents a summary of the main responses to the consultation based on a systematic analysis. The report covers the responses to any closed questions (i.e. those with an answer scale) and a summary of analysis of the most common themes mentioned in response to the open questions, based on thematic coding undertaken by Ipsos MORI.

In addition to this, a number of questions in the consultation were reviewed by a team at the Home Office. For completeness the Home Office analysis is also included under the cover of this report to ensure that all of the responses are collated in one analytical document for further review.

Analysis and coding of responses

The process of analysing the content of each response to the open-ended follow up questions was based on thematic coding undertaken by Ipsos MORI. This is a system where unique summary 'codes' are applied to specific words or phrases contained in the text of the response. These codes include a sentiment, in this case whether a comment was positive/supportive or negative/unsupportive. The application of these summary codes and sub-codes to the content of the responses allows systematic analysis of the data.

⁵ There were 4,225 'partial' responses to the consultation which were omitted from analysis. These participants did not complete and formally submit their response form meaning they did not provide consent to participating.

⁶ Campaign responses are defined as a co-ordinated approach by an individual or organisation to facilitate others into submitting responses.

Ipsos MORI developed an initial coding framework (i.e. a list of codes to be applied) based on the text of the first responses received. This initial set of codes was created by drawing out the common themes and points raised. The initial coding framework was then updated throughout the analysis process to ensure that any newly emerging themes were captured. Developing the coding framework in this way ensured that it would provide an accurate representation of what participants said.

Ipsos MORI used a web-based system called *Ascribe* to manage the coding of all the text in the responses. *Ascribe* is a system which has been used on numerous large-scale consultation projects. Responses were uploaded onto the *Ascribe* system, where members of the Ipsos MORI coding team then worked systematically through the comments and applied a code to each relevant part(s) of them.

The *Ascribe* system allowed for detailed monitoring of the coding process and the organic development of the coding framework (i.e. the addition of new codes to new comments). A team of coders worked to review all the responses as they were uploaded to the *Ascribe* system. All coders received a thorough briefing about the objectives of the consultation before they could undertake analysis of responses. It was also necessary for coders to have read the Consultation Document before undertaking their analysis of responses.

To ensure that no detail was lost, coders were briefed to raise codes that reflected what was being said in responses. These were then collapsed into a smaller number of key themes at the analysis stage to help with reporting. During the initial stages of the coding process, weekly meetings were held with the coding team to ensure a consistent approach in raising new codes and to ensure that all additional codes were appropriately and consistently assigned. The Home Office were given the opportunity to review the codeframe on a weekly basis to verify that any issues raised were being interpreted and thematically analysed correctly.

For those who provided comments via email or letter (and not as per the questionnaire format), each of their comments were attributed to the relevant questions in the response form. This means for example, that if a member of the public submitted a response via email and made comments consistent with a response to Q18 of the response form, then such comments were analysed alongside responses submitted to that particular question. This approach ensured that responses via all channels were analysed using the same framework.

The purpose of having closed questions was to enable measurement of support/agreement for the particular policy area within the proposal, whilst the open-ended follow up questions then allowed participants to further expand upon their opinion or provide reasoning.

Interpreting the findings

While a consultation exercise is a valuable way to gather opinions about a wide-ranging topic, there are a number of factors that should be kept in mind when interpreting the responses.

- While the consultation was open to everyone, the participants were self-selecting. In consultations there can be a tendency for responses to come from those more likely to consider themselves affected and therefore more motivated to express their views. In previous consultations we have also found that responses tend to be polarised between those who think the proposals will benefit them or their area, and conversely those who think they will have a negative effect. Consultations do not tend to fully capture the views of the 'silent majority', who may be less opinionated about the proposals under consideration.
- Therefore, it must be understood that the consultation findings, as reflected through this report, can only be used to record the various opinions of the members of the stakeholder and non-stakeholder participants who have chosen to respond to the proposals contained within the Consultation Document. Due to the self-selecting nature of the method, findings should not be aggregated up to be representative of any type of participant, nor be used to represent the wider opinion of any particular sectors. As such any figures presented are done so as numbers and not as percentages.

Report structure

This report has been divided into four chapters which correspond to the associated chapters and questions included in the Consultation Document:

- **Section 1:** Who (or where) should legislation apply to?
- **Section 2:** What should the requirements be?
- **Section 3:** How should compliance work?
- **Section 4:** How should Government best support and work with partners?

Section 1

Who (or where) should legislation apply to?

1 Section 1: Summary of responses

1.1 Introduction

The proposed Protect Duty could apply to three main areas (but may also apply to other locations, parties and processes by exception):

1. Public venues (e.g. entertainment and sports venues, tourist attractions, shopping centres)
2. Large organisations (e.g. retail, or entertainment chains) and
3. Public spaces (e.g. public parks, beaches, thoroughfares, bridges, town / city squares and pedestrianised areas).

The Consultation Document made three proposals upon which feedback was sought. They focussed on legislative considerations of security being undertaken at certain Publicly Accessible Locations, but not private venues, such as places of employment, or other locations where there is no public access. These proposals were:

1. The Duty should apply to owners and/or operators of publicly accessible venues with a capacity of 100 persons or more
2. The Duty should apply to large organisations (employing 250 staff or more) that operate at Publicly Accessible Locations and
3. The Duty should be used to improve security considerations and outcomes at public spaces.

This part of the consultation also considered whether other locations, parties or processes should be included within the scope of a Protect Duty to ensure better public protection and organisational preparedness. It also set out a list of sectors which it proposed should be exempt from the Duty.

This section summarises the responses to some of the above questions which were asked in the consultation.

1.2 Support/opposition for a Protect Duty

Participants were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the concept of a Protect Duty legislation.

Figure 1.1: Support/opposition for concept of a Protect Duty



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Around seven in ten of those who responded to this question in the consultation (1,664) agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, whilst around one in five (421) disagreed. There was no obvious difference in responses from those participants who owned multiple accessible locations compared to those who owned just one.

Participants made over 70 suggestions as to the type of venues and places which they felt the Protect Duty legislation should apply to. The table below provides a summary of the most mentioned locations.

Table 1.1: Top venues and places which legislation should apply to

Type of venue/place	Number of
All Publicly Accessible Locations	53
All organisations / venues / regardless of the size	32
All venues of large gatherings (min size not specified)	31
Places of worship / religious institutions	31
All organisations / venues	26
Private venues	20
Public transport [rail / airports / bus]	19
Charitable / not for profit / voluntary organisations	16
Event organisers / management / staff / not just the venue	16
Local authorities / local authorities' events	16
Owners / licence holders	15
Sporting venues / events	14
Hospitals / health care providers	11
Temporary events	10

The most commonly cited opinion amongst participants was that all Publicly Accessible Locations should be 'in scope' for the Protect Duty legislation. In particular, opinion favoured the inclusion of large gatherings, although others did not specify a particular size threshold and felt it should be applied to venues regardless of size.

1.3 The criteria for inclusion in the Protect Duty legislation

The consultation asked participants which criteria should best determine which venues a Duty should apply to. Participants could choose more than one response if they thought Publicly Accessible Locations should have to meet more than one criterion.

Figure 1.2: Criteria to determine which venues a Duty should apply to



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Over half of those who responded (1,267 out of 2,388) felt venue capacity should determine whether a Duty should be applied or not. Significantly fewer participants thought that staffing levels (292) or annual revenue (166) would be the best determinants.

Of those participants who selected 'other' as an option, the most commonly cited criteria were:

- The evaluated risk level of Publicly Accessible Locations and the likelihood of those locations being a target due to the nature of their operation (e.g. faith sites)
- Average (rather than maximum) capacity
- The location of Publicly Accessible Locations and
- The type of events held at Publicly Accessible Locations.

Some participants proposed that Publicly Accessible Locations should have to meet multiple, rather than just one, criteria in order to be in scope of the Duty.

Figure 1.3: Capacity levels to determine venues in scope of the Duty



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Just over half of all participants responding (428 out of 806) thought that the threshold should be 100 and therefore agreed with the Government proposal. Of the remaining participants who responded, almost twice as many thought that the threshold should be higher than 100 (246) than lower (132). The mean of all suggested capacity thresholds was 303 persons. Additionally, the mean capacity given by those who suggested that the threshold should be lower than 100 was 47, whilst the mean capacity given by those who suggested that the threshold should be higher than 100 was 824.

Figure 1.4: Size thresholds for inclusion in the scope of the Duty



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The most commonly mentioned theme was that all organisations should be within the scope of a Protect Duty regardless of their size (664 out of 2348). Generally, participants tended to agree that larger organisations (250+ employees) should be included in scope compared to smaller organisations, with very few (43) considering micro-organisations (1-9 employees) to be within scope.


Some participants made other comments in response to this question.

- The term 'organisation' needs to be clearly defined
- The types of employees which are encompassed in the staffing threshold needs to be made clear (i.e. volunteers, part-time, agency etc.)
- Consideration should be given to the fact that some organisations are staffed by volunteers, with participants tending to favour the exclusion of voluntary staff from staffing numbers and
- Staff numbers should be considered at a site/Publicly Accessible Location level rather than the total number of staff employed by the organisation.

1.4 Appropriateness of venue owners/operators providing security mitigations

The consultation asked participants about the responsibility of publicly accessible venues and organisations to prepare their staff to respond in the event of an attack.

Figure 1.5: Staff preparedness in the event of a terrorist attack



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Around seven in ten (1,655 out of 2345) agreed that owners and operators of Publicly Accessible Locations have a responsibility to prepare staff in the event of an attack. Around twice as many participants (1,578 out of 2349) felt that it was appropriate for owners and operators to consider security and implement appropriate mitigations compared to those who disagreed (771).

Figure 1.6: Requirement of owners/operators to consider security and implement appropriate mitigations



Participants were then asked about the appropriateness of owners and/or venue operators to consider security and implement appropriate mitigations at a venue. Around twice as many participants responding to this question (1,578) felt that it was appropriate for owners and operators to consider security and implement appropriate mitigations compared to those who disagreed (771).

For the participants who indicated 'no' (i.e. that owners and operators should not be responsible) they were asked why they thought this. Key issues raised in response to this question included:

- There may not be enough staff to implement the Duty
- Owners and operators may not be able to afford to implement the Duty
- It is too much of a burden for owners and operators to take on
- The responsibility should lie joint or solely with other parties such as:
 - Local authorities
 - Police
 - The Government and
 - Security services.
- The operator of the publicly accessible space should be responsible, rather than the owner.

1.5 Parties working together at venues with shared occupancy and security responsibility

The Protect Duty proposed that parties should work together where there is shared occupancy and responsibility for security. Participants were asked in the consultation whether they see this as appropriate.

Figure 1.7: Parties working together where there is a shared organisational responsibility for a venue




A majority of participants (979 out of 1198) agreed that parties should work together where there is a shared organisational responsibility for a venue. Of those who indicated 'no' the most mentioned reason (118) was that it would be too burdensome/cumbersome for organisations, particularly for those run by volunteers and community groups.

1.6 Understanding of the definition of a Publicly Accessible Location

Participants were asked whether they were clear about whether their organisation falls within the scope of the definition of a Publicly Accessible Location, which is defined as 'a place to which the public or any section of the public has access, on payment or otherwise, as of right or by virtue of express or implied permission'.

Figure 1.8: Clarity about whether organisation falls within definition of Publicly Accessible Location




Ipsos MORI 

The vast majority of participants owning or operating a Publicly Accessible Location (711 out of 763) replied that they were aware of their organisations' classification and whether it falls within the scope of the definition of Publicly Accessible Location.

1.7 Definition of a 'large organisation'

The Government has proposed that a Protect Duty would apply to organisations with 250 or more employees. Participants were asked whether it was clear as to whether their organisations' fall within this criterion.

Figure 1.9: Clarity about whether organisation falls within size criterion




Ipsos MORI 

In terms of the Government proposed size criterion, whereby Protect Duty would apply to organisations with 250 or more employees, around 7 in 10 of those responding (567 out of 763) did know whether their organisation falls into the definition.

1.8 Other exemptions from the Duty (other than those listed in Annex 1)

The consultation then asked participants to refer to Annex 1 of the consultation document⁷ and then consider whether they thought that there should be other exemptions from a Protect Duty.

Figure 1.10: Other Protect Duty exemptions



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Whilst a majority of participants (1,347 out of 2340) did not think there should be other exemptions (other than those in Annex 1) from a Protect Duty, two in five responding to this question (993) did think there should be. For those who indicated that there should be other exemptions from the Protect Duty the most reported exemptions included:

- Exemptions for Publicly Accessible Locations situated in low-risk (particularly rural) locations. This was frequently noted by those responding on behalf of places of worship
- Exemptions based on the score of a risk assessment
- Exemptions for charities and Publicly Accessible Locations run primarily or solely by volunteers
- Exemptions for community groups and village halls and
- Exemptions for places of worship, particularly if they are small.

⁷ Annex 1 of the consultation documents sets out examples of locations and stakeholders that the Home Office propose should be exempt from a Protect Duty. The consultation document, including Annex 1, can be accessed using the following link: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/964808/Protect_Duty_Consultation_Document5.pdf

Section 2

What should the requirements be?

2 Section 2: Summary of responses

2.1 Introduction


Section 2 of the Consultation Document provided information about what parties within the scope of a Protect Duty should be required to do. An emphasis was placed on the need for all organisations to consider the safety and security of staff and the public who use their facilities, and promoting partnership working by multiple organisations who own or operate at public spaces in order to achieve effective security outcomes. It emphasised that for many organisations, venues, and public spaces, a Duty would potentially mean simple changes to existing systems and processes, with no or extremely low-cost implications, whilst for others it would mean more significant considerations (which for some would reflect work already undertaken).

The consultation posed some questions about this element of a Duty and the responses are summarised in this chapter.

2.2 Best practice for protective security and organisational preparedness outcomes at public spaces

Participants were asked whether their organisations currently undertake a risk assessment for terrorism. Responses were split between those who undertook a risk assessment (540) and those who did not (543).

Figure 2.1: Organisations undertaking a risk assessment for terrorism




Of those who responded 'yes' to producing a risk assessment, the majority (449) produced the risk assessment in house rather than procure it via an externally appointed individual (105).

Most organisations that conduct risk assessments review them at least once a year, with just under half (400) reviewing them multiple times a year. Six in ten participants whose organisations undertake risk assessments (606) spent a median of 4 days on such assessments. Other points raised were that:

- Risk assessments are undertaken continuously (continued overleaf)

- It was not possible to give an accurate figure and
- Some participants indicated that they conducted risk assessments with the help of police and/or Counter Terrorism Security Advisors.

Figure 2.2: Risk assessment reviews



Mitigations against terrorism risks

Participants were asked what counter terrorism mitigations their organisations currently undertake. The most commonly mentioned mitigations undertaken are summarised below.

Table 2.1: Mitigations against terrorism risks

Q23. What mitigations against terrorism risks does your organisation currently undertake (select all that apply)?	No. of participants
Liaison with police or other resource (e.g. security consultant) on threats and appropriate security measures	529
Work to ensure security behaviours are adopted by the workforce	502
Staff training is undertaken to raise awareness of the threat and what to do	498
Evacuation procedures are in place and are understood and exercised by staff	491
Site/location vulnerabilities (to terrorist threats) and appropriate physical mitigations are considered	484
Personnel security policies and procedures consider security risks	462
Well defined organisational security protocols and procedures, including for response to terrorist attack	433
Measures are in place to spot and disrupt hostile reconnaissance	412
Business continuity procedures or app (e.g. Action Counters Terrorism app) include information on how to respond to attacks	399
Involved in local security initiatives	247
TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS	1,083

For a small number of participants who indicated the 'other' option, other mitigations undertaken included:

- CCTV, security-trained staff, risk assessments, measures to deter general crime, work with counter-terrorism police and/or Counter Terrorism Security Advisors, Government security advice and
- Some participants who indicated that they owned/operated a Publicly Accessible Location or that they were responsible for security at a Publicly Accessible Location reported that they undertook no mitigations against terrorism.

Expenditure

Participants were asked how much money their organisations typically spend on new or revised security measures or processes that would mitigate against terrorist risks in one financial year.

Of those who responded to the question (1,148), just under a quarter of participants (254) gave a cost estimate, of which the range was significant, equating to a mean of £9.64m and a median of £20,000. The most common free text responses included:

- Money spent was 'not much' and
- Money spent varies depending on the event held.

Best protective security and organisational preparedness outcomes at public spaces

Participants were asked what they considered to be the existing activities and mechanisms which resulted in the best protective security and organisational preparedness outcomes at public spaces. The table below summarises the results for each of the measures presented.

Table 2.2: Best protective security and organisational preparedness activities/mechanisms

Q25. What are the existing activities and mechanisms which you consider result in the best protective security and organisational preparedness outcomes at public spaces?	No. of participants
Staff awareness raising and training courses	698
Communications campaigns e.g. Action Counters Terrorism and See It, Say It, Sorted	642
Advice and guidance products and tools	476
Local authority mechanisms and processes	449

Activities and mechanisms focussing on awareness raising were frequently mentioned by participants as effective methods which result in better protective security and organisational preparedness outcomes at public spaces. Activities and mechanisms which were more procedural and advice-based were cited less in comparison.

Other activities and mechanisms which participants considered resulted in the best protective security and organisational preparedness outcomes at public spaces included:

- The Police
- Raising awareness among the general public (continued overleaf)

- Relevant and up-to-date training and
- Mechanisms in place by the Local Authority.

2.3 Potential for existing activities and mechanisms to do more to achieve mitigation of terrorist threats at public spaces

Participants were asked to identify the existing local authority functions which currently result in the best protective security and organisational preparedness outcomes at public spaces. The table below shows the results for each of the functions presented.

Table 2.3: Best existing local authority functions for realising security outcomes

Q26. What are the existing local authority functions which currently result in the best protective security and organisational preparedness outcomes at public spaces?	No. of participants
Health and Safety, fire safety and building control processes	643
Safety Advisory Groups (for events)	477
Community Safety Partnerships	442
Licensing Committees (for the sale and supply of alcohol, the provision of late-night entertainment and refreshment)	382
Licensing for sports grounds safety	345
Local Resilience Forums	337
Planning processes	326
CONTEST and Protect Boards	244
Business Improvement Districts (which can be set up by Local Authorities, businesses, or individuals to benefit local businesses)	221
TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS	1,083

Existing local authority functions, which included dedicated safety briefs (such as fire safety and building control processes) were mentioned more frequently as functions which currently result in the best protective security and organisational preparedness outcomes at public spaces. Existing local authority functions which were more generic in nature were mentioned less frequently in comparison.

Support required to improve/support existing local authority functions to realise more effective security outcomes

Participants were asked what would be required to improve or support existing local authority functions to realise more effective security outcomes. There were a range of themes raised in response to this question.

- Better awareness/visibility, with some proposing the use of effective advertising campaigns, whilst others focussed more on the need to improve awareness of the threat level
- Better engagement/communication, via a range of communication channels (e.g. online, radio, text message) but also with partners and other stakeholders such as Business Improvement Districts, Counter Terrorism Security Advisors, emergency services, planning/licensing departments, Prevent, Safety Advisory Groups, the Security Industry Association, the Government, the transport industry, and with other stakeholders more generally. Some felt engagement should be made mandatory or even should be legislated for (continued overleaf)

- More advice and information sharing, which is up to date and most notably when it comes to best practice, advice from industry experts, and from the police
- More funding/resources, both for local authorities but others referred to the need for additional funding for the police and to fund local resilience forums etc.
- Training, mainly for security staff and for Safety Advisory Groups
- Means to hold organisations and venues accountable
- To provide bespoke advice and support depending on the size type of organisation/venue
- Accountability, mainly for organisations and venues under a Protect Duty
- Closer collaboration/joined up working and co-ordination, with the police, Counter Terrorism Security Advisors and local resilience forums
- A dedicated point of contact
- Consistency in various aspects such as guidance, messaging, and requirements
- Facilitating greater advice and guidance from Safety Advisory Groups
- Legislation and licensing, as well as for some including security in the planning process
- More group meetings/get-togethers
- Additional powers to Safety Advisory Groups
- More visits and checks
- Planning, including for some when it comes to the design of event spaces
- Conducting reviews, including with greater regularity
- To carry out risk assessments, with some expecting a risk calculator tool based on location / capacity / event type / alert status etc. and
- Safety/security measures.

2.4 Need for a legislative requirement for public spaces for local authorities and other local partners

Participants were asked for their views on a potential legislative requirement for local authorities (and relevant public authorities such as Highways Agencies) and other relevant local partners to develop a strategic plan to combat terrorism, to ensure public security, through partnership working.

Table 2.4: Views on legislative requirement for strategic plan

Q30. What are your views on a potential legislative requirement for local authorities (and relevant public authorities such as Highways Agencies) and other relevant local partners to develop a strategic plan to combat terrorism, to ensure public security, through partnership working? ⁸	Number of participants who support the legislative strategic plan	Number of participants who oppose the legislative strategic plan	Net support +/-
All who provided a response (1,842)	652	759	-107
Stakeholder (404)	135	176	-41
Non-Stakeholder (1,438)	517	583	-66

There were more participants who opposed (759 out of 1,842) a legislative requirement for local authorities and other local partners to develop a strategic plan, than those who supported it (652).

There was a relatively large number of suggestions made by participants in response to this question. The top mentioned suggestions are shown in the table below.


Suggestion	Number of participants making a suggestion
The legislative strategic plan should be proportionate to the risk	115
The legislative strategic plan should have clear roles / responsibilities / expectations	97
The legislative strategic plan should be backed by funding / resources	83
The legislative strategic plan should be led / implemented by the local authorities	75
The legislative strategic plan should have clear guidelines / full guidance	72
The legislative strategic plan should provide training	66
The legislative strategic plan should be flexible / not one size fits all	63

⁸ Summary tables throughout this report break down the supportive and opposing comments by stakeholders and non-stakeholders. Participants also made various other comments which have been categorised accordingly e.g. suggestions, miscellaneous comments, conditional support. While these other comments have been considered by the Home Office, these figures have been excluded from the summary tables.

Organisations which could play a role in bringing together partnerships

Participants were asked which organisations could play a role in bringing together partnerships. Local government organisations were the most mentioned in response to this question (620). Emergency services (212), businesses and business owners (185), and Government departments (177) were also frequently cited as organisations which participants felt could play a leading role in bringing together partnerships. There were 1,374 other responses to this question which cited a variety of additional organisations. A full breakdown of organisations and results can be found in Figure 2.3 below.

Figure 2.3: Organisations which could play a leading role



Ipsos MORI 

What could be achieved by such partnerships

Participants were asked what requirements could potentially be delivered by partnerships to improve protective security and preparedness. They were also asked whether it was reasonable to require relevant organisations (for example those surrounding sites where there is an existing legislative requirement for security) to work in partnership to achieve security outcomes.

A total of 1,631 participants provided a response to these questions. Of these participants, 977 left comments which were supportive of the requirement for relevant organisations to work in partnership to achieve security outcomes. There were 291 participants who made opposing comments.

Table 2.5: Views on partnership approaches to improve security outcomes

Q33. What requirements to improve protective security and preparedness could be realistically achieved by such partnerships? Q35. Where there is an existing legislative requirement for security (e.g. at certain sports grounds and transport sites, or in future those organisations and venues subject to a Protect Duty), is it reasonable to require relevant organisations (for example those surrounding the site) to work in partnership to achieve security outcomes?	Number of participants who support partnerships and their outcomes	Number of participants who oppose partnerships and their outcomes	Net support +/-
All who provided a response (1,631)	977	291	+686
Stakeholder (359)	208	65	+143
Non-Stakeholder (1,272)	769	226	+543

The main reason for support was due to the potential benefits that collaborative partnerships bring, in particular when considering the sharing of information. Ultimately, such an arrangement was perceived to improve public safety and security and considered by some to be long overdue.

There was also a feeling that such partnerships would serve to increase awareness of threats, reduce vulnerabilities, will help provide a holistic picture of threats and would also be of benefit to those organisations surrounding the venues.

Some conditional support was also offered by participants, which touched on issues previously raised during the consultation including ensuring that the partnerships were appropriate and proportionate to the risk and threat posed. Others identified the importance of providing funding and associated resources as well.

Fewer participants did not support the convening of such partnerships (291). The main reasons for opposition were that such partnerships were unnecessary and that 'guidance only' would be sufficient. Others felt the creation of partnerships would be unreasonable and disproportionate to the risks.

2.5 Appropriateness of introducing legislative guidance to achieve greater certainty on security considerations and outcomes

Participants were asked about where there is currently Government security guidance, for example with bus and coach operators and commercial ports, and whether it would be appropriate for this guidance to become legislative under the Protect Duty to achieve greater certainty on security considerations and outcomes.

Table 2.6: Views on Government security guidance to become legislative guidance

Q36. Where there is currently Government security guidance (e.g. bus and coach operators and commercial ports and UK flagged ships) would it be appropriate for this guidance to become legislative guidance under the Protect Duty to achieve greater certainty on security considerations and outcomes?	Number of participants who support the Government security guidance to become legislative guidance	Number of participants who oppose the Government security guidance to become legislative guidance	Net support +/-
All who provided a response (1,351)	872	274	+598
Stakeholder (293)	171	65	+106
Non-Stakeholder (1,058)	701	209	+492

Where there is currently Government security guidance, 872 out of 1,351 believe it would be appropriate for this guidance to become legislative under Protect Duty.

A total of 274 participants made comments in opposition to the appropriateness of introducing legislative guidance. The main reasons for opposition are:

- Legislation would be unnecessary as current guidance is sufficient
- Legislation would be disproportionate and heavy-handed
- Implementing the legislation would be expensive and add costs to places already struggling financially
- Legislation would not be sufficiently flexible
- There would be a 'one size fits all' approach and
- Legislation would increase bureaucracy and red tape.

2.6 Mandating published security guidance/voluntary schemes for products that could be used as weapons under a Protect Duty

Participants were asked to comment on whether it would be reasonable for businesses and other operators to be mandated to follow published security guidance and/or voluntary schemes for products that could be used as weapons under a Protect Duty. The majority of participants responding to this question (844) also thought it would be reasonable for businesses and other operators to be mandated to follow Protect Duty (compared to 296 who opposed).

Table 2.7: Views on businesses to be mandated to follow the guidance under a protect duty

Q37. Where Government has published security guidance (e.g. bus and coach operators and commercial ports and UK flagged ships) or put in place voluntary schemes for products that could be used as weapons, would it be reasonable for businesses and other operators responsible to be mandated to follow that guidance under a Protect Duty?	Number of participants who support businesses to be mandated to follow the guidance under a protect duty	Number of participants who oppose businesses to be mandated to follow the guidance under a protect duty	Net support +/-
All who provided a response (1,372)	844	296	+548
Stakeholder (292)	168	64	+104
Non-Stakeholder (1,080)	676	232	+444

2.7 Engagement with partner organisations to ensure a better understanding of terrorist threat, the management of risk and mitigation measures

The consultation asked how organisations that work at public spaces could be encouraged or required to engage with partner organisations (e.g. police) to ensure there is a better understanding of terrorist threat, the management of risk and mitigation measures. The key themes raised by participants are summarised in the table below.

Theme	Number of participants
Encourage engagement with the police	195
Make engagement mandatory / legislate it	180
Improve collaboration / coordination / joined up working	130
Convene local meetings/forums	129
Training / education	118
Make engagement a condition of licensing / permissions	96
Provide clear guidelines / full guidance	85
More visits / presence / checks - from the police	80
Provide funding / resources	76
Provide advice / information	73
Share best practice	70
Improve awareness / visibility	62
Set clear roles / responsibilities / expectations	56
Provide a dedicated contact person to liaise - within the police	55
TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS	1,397

The comments reflected the value which participants placed on effective communication, and this was a common theme running through a large proportion of the responses. Participants had slightly different views as to the type of communication or engagement which would be required, but nevertheless the emphasis on its importance was clear in the responses.

Other less commonly mentioned themes included:

- Letting the police lead engagement (and ensuring they had adequate funding and resources) and placing greater trust in them
- Greater awareness and visibility of the threat level (potentially via better education of staff) and
- The potential need to incentivise organisations and venues by ensuring there is no prohibited costs involved.

2.8 Anticipated costs and benefits of intervention in the form of a Protect Duty

Participants were asked about Annex 3⁹, which sets out the anticipated costs and benefits of intervention in the form of a Protect Duty, and whether they had any comments on this. There were around twice as many negative comments towards the costs and benefits of intervention than positive comments.

Table 2.8: Comments on Annex 3 – costs and benefits

Q40. Annex 3 sets out the anticipated costs and benefits of intervention in the form of a Protect Duty. Please provide any comments you have on this Annex.	Number of participants who support Annex 3 – costs and benefits	Number of participants who oppose Annex 3 – costs and benefits	Net support +/-
All who provided a response (977)	235	642	-407
Stakeholder (261)	55	183	-128
Non-Stakeholder (716)	180	459	-279

In terms of negative comments, the main issues raised included:

- The expense, which would add additional costs for a range of stakeholders, both for businesses in scope but also for those on the enforcement/regulatory side (e.g. police, local authorities). Concern was raised for charities and those organisations operating in the voluntary sector, places of worship/religious institutions and also for smaller organisations and venues
- The potential closure of businesses and venues due to the cost implications
- The increased insurance premiums/costs
- The perceived vagueness of the costs (and benefits)
- The lack of benefit to some, including religious institutions, low risk premises and smaller organisations and venues
- The benefits are considered unrealistic and have been overstated
- Costs have been understated and would end up being greater
- The costs will outweigh the benefits
- The increased burden on some organisations and volunteers
- The impact on charities and voluntary organisations, including the potential to reduce participation in charitable work and
- The potential of it to undermine public confidence by continued focus on terrorist threats.

⁹ The consultation document, including Annex 3, can be accessed using the following link:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/964808/Protect_Duty_Consultation_Document5.pdf

Of those participants who made supportive comments in response to the costs and benefits of intervention set out in Annex 3, the key reasons included:

- The costs are justified, and it was considered that the benefits would outweigh the cost
- Costs and benefits are reasonable, fair and have been accurately laid out
- The overall benefits were recognised, including the overriding importance of public security and safety and
- The positive impact on public confidence to reduce fear and the perceived knock-on benefit to the economy. Some cited their belief that it would ultimately save lives, and this was the greatest benefit of them all.

There were other participants who made comments offering conditional support to the costs/benefits presented in Annex 3, with the main reason being the assumption that the costs were accurate and reasonable.

Section 3

**How should
compliance work?**

3 Section 3: Summary of responses

3.1 Introduction

Section 3 of the Consultation Document considered how those within scope of a Protect Duty could demonstrate compliance in the most efficient way. It also set out the basis on which Government would oversee and seek assurance on the delivery of a Protect Duty and sought views on the use of civil penalties for non-compliance.

3.2 How an inspection regime could best be used to support improvements to security culture and practices

Participants were asked how an inspection regime could best be used to support improvements to security culture and practices.

The comments received in response to this question were split almost equally between those which stated support for such a regime and those which opposed it.

Table 3.1: Views on a Duty inspection regime

Q42. How can an inspection regime best be used to support improvements to security culture and practices?	Number of participants who support inspection regime	Number of participants who oppose inspection regime	Net support +/-
All who provided a response (1,780)	194	191	+3
Stakeholder (394)	42	47	-5
Non-Stakeholder (1,386)	152	144	+8

Of those participants who made comments in support of an inspection regime, the main reasons for the support included:

- The identification of areas in need of improvement and any associated weaknesses or vulnerabilities
- Such a regime will improve compliance with the Duty and encourage buy-in
- A way of sharing best practice
- Such inspection is long overdue and necessary
- Ultimately, public safety will be improved and
- It would lead to an improvement in confidence and knowledge whilst increasing awareness and consistency amongst venues and operators.

Of those who submitted comments in opposition to an inspection regime, the main reasons were that participants did not think it would be necessary and current measures are sufficient, with an inspection regime viewed as heavy handed and disproportionate to the point of being unreasonable. Some saw the costs as being prohibitive and felt they would be better spent elsewhere, whilst the potential challenges of enforcing such inspections were other reasons cited against the proposal.

3.3 Operation of a compliance regime (inspection and enforcement)

Participants were asked to provide comments about how a compliance regime (inspection and enforcement) could operate. Some participants identified actual measures which could be implemented as part of such a regime, whilst others raised suggestions in response.

The table below summarises the top measures which participants thought should be key elements of a compliance regime.

Table 3.2: Top measures to be key elements of compliance regime

Compliance regime measure	Number of participants
Training	115
Regular visits / inspections	104
Audits	65
Penalties / punishments for non-compliance / proper enforcement required	64
Checks / spot checks	56
Health and safety measures	56
Regular visits / inspections, which could be unannounced	46
Regular annual visits / inspections	44
Accreditation / certification system	44
Self-assessments	43
Fire safety inspections	36
Regular visits / inspections, which are announced / planned	33

3.4 Use of civil penalties for non-compliance

Participants were asked for their views on the use of civil penalties (fines) for organisations who persistently fail to take reasonable steps to reduce the potential impact of attacks associated with ensuring compliance with a Protect Duty.

Overall, opinion towards the use of fines for non-compliance was relatively split. There were strong arguments presented by participants which both supported and opposed the proposal.

Table 3.3: Views on civil penalties

Q43. What are your views on the use of civil penalties (fines) for organisations who persistently fail to take reasonable steps to reduce the potential impact of attacks associated with ensuring compliance with a Protect Duty?	Number of participants who support civil penalties	Number of participants who oppose civil penalties	Net support +/-
All who provided a response (1,780)	517	547	-30
Stakeholder (394)	99	153	-54
Non-Stakeholder (1,386)	418	394	+24

Reasons for supporting the use of fines included:

- Increase in compliance
- The feeling that civil penalties are necessary and overdue
- The increase in accountability of venues and organisations
- The perceived fairness of such penalties and
- Ultimately the measure would lead to an improvement in public safety and security.

Reasons for opposing the civil penalty proposal included:

- Not needed and/or unfair
- The definition of 'reasonable steps' was ambiguous and unclear
- The need to exclude some types of venues and organisations
- The challenges associated with the cost to enforce civil penalties
- The potential for it to be counter-productive and
- Ultimately not lead to improved compliance.

3.5 Other comments in relation to the operation of a compliance regime

There were some other comments made across the consultation in relation to the operation of a compliance regime.

Table 3.4: Comments on compliance regime

Q44. Do you have any other comments regarding how a compliance regime (inspection and enforcement) could operate?	Number of participants who support compliance regime	Number of participants who oppose compliance regime	Net support +/-
All who provided a response (1,780)	21	159	-138
Stakeholder (394)	6	37	-31
Non-Stakeholder (1,386)	15	122	-107

In summary, those comments which supported the operation of a compliance regime reiterated support, whilst others commented that it had worked elsewhere and was long overdue.

Those comments reiterating their opposition to such a regime included some key themes raised elsewhere in some responses, including the heavy handedness of it, the potential cost, the potential negative impact on holding events and the potential for it to be harmful to some businesses.

Section 4

**How should
Government best
support and work with
partners?**

4 Section 4: Summary of responses

4.1 Introduction

Section 4 of the Consultation Document outlined how Government currently provides advice and guidance to those responsible for Publicly Accessible Locations, and how these efforts could be enhanced, and new mechanisms progressed to support the delivery of the Protect Duty.

The Document highlighted new mechanisms developed by Government to increase the range of engagement and to provide tools and products tailored to the needs of users. However, it also acknowledged that engagement and uptake is voluntary, and awareness of these tools can be low amongst those responsible for Publicly Accessible Locations. If a Protect Duty is developed, efforts to support organisations within the scope of the Duty will need to be enhanced. It outlined some of this potential advice and guidance.

The Consultation Document went on to identify the importance of member and representative organisations, including the security industry, in raising awareness in terms of communication and supporting delivery, and how a Protect Duty could be used to incentivise rather than enforce compliance. It considered that this was important in ensuring that the Duty does not inadvertently create any unintended consequences or costs.

This section summarises responses to the questions which were then asked of participants in Section 4.

4.2 What would be most useful to help comply with a Protect Duty?

All participants who own/operate a Publicly Accessible Location or are responsible for security of a Publicly Accessible Location (1,083) were asked what they would find most useful in helping them to comply with a Protect Duty. The table below shows the results for each of the measures presented.

Table 4.1: Most useful measures to help comply with a Protect Duty

Q48. What would you find most useful to help you to comply with a Protect Duty?	No. of participants
A single, digital service where you could access relevant material, advice and training in one place	806
A risk assessment template	795
Information on undertaking a risk assessment for terrorism threats	671
Easy to digest information regarding threat and attack methodologies	667
Advice on what constitutes reasonably practicable and appropriate mitigations appropriate for my circumstances	657
Staff training and awareness courses	654
Advice relating to how an organisation can prepare for terrorism attack	591
Advice relating to protective security mitigations	583
E-learning products	582
Advice relating to personnel and people security	577
A local meeting where I can talk about the Duty with experts and other similar organisations	551
A sector meeting where I can talk about the Duty with experts and other similar organisations	466
An App	393
Development of product certifications or standards for aspects of the approach	380
Other	186

Almost three quarters of Publicly Accessible Location operators or owners would find most useful in helping them comply with a Protect Duty was a digital service where relevant materials, advice and training could be accessed in one place (806). Slightly fewer felt a risk assessment template (795) would be useful while over three in five requested information on undertaking a risk assessment for terrorism threats (671).

More than half of Publicly Accessible Location owners or operators felt that advice in particular areas would be most useful in helping them comply with a Protect Duty, including:

- Advice on what constitutes reasonably practicable and appropriate mitigations for my circumstances (657)
- Advice relating to how an organisation can prepare for potential terrorist attack (591)
- Advice relating to protective security mitigations (583) and
- Advice relating to personnel and people security (577).

4.3 Advice and support required for organisations and venues within scope of the Protect Duty

Participants were asked what advice and support they thought would be required for organisations and venues within the scope of the Protect Duty. The Consultation Document went on to also ask about the complexities of public spaces and what additional bespoke support and expertise could be provided, given the potential need for partnership working.

In terms of the advice and support required for organisations within the scope of Protect Duty, the most commonly raised themes by participants (1,185) were ensuring advice and support is bespoke and not 'one size fits all', the need for clarity and the importance of effective engagement and communication. Participants also highlighted the need to involve security experts when it comes to providing advice and guidance.

4.4 How Government could best support and work with partners

Participants were asked if they had any other proposals about what Government could do to support partners in the delivery of a Protect Duty. A total of 483 participants left a response at this question.

The main support identified in response to this question was the need for Government to provide funding and resources. Some responses specified who such resources should be targeted at – for example, emergency services, local authorities, local resilience forums, security services and the police. Others requested the provision of loans to purchase security equipment.


The other main piece of support was to provide information, advice and guidance, which is:

- Bespoke
- Easily accessible and from a single source
- Simple and easy to understand
- Clear about which mitigating measures are effective
- Online
- Regularly and pro-actively updates and
- Supports organisations and venues to plan.

4.5 Usage and rating of current guidance

All participants who own/operate a Publicly Accessible Location or are responsible for security of a Publicly Accessible Location (1,083) were asked if they currently access Government advice regarding threat, protective security, and preparedness. There were more who said they did access Government advice (599) compared to those who said they did not (484).

Figure 4.1: Those who access Government advice regarding threat, protective security and preparedness



The most common reasons for not accessing Government advice and guidance included not knowing it existed (217), not thinking they needed to address the threat (200), lack of time to access the information (74), and too confusing to find what they want (34).

Q47. Why do you not currently access this advice and guidance?	Number of participants
I did not know it existed	217
I do not think I need to address the threat	200
I do not have the time to access this	74
It is too confusing to find what I want	34
Other	302

4.6 Access to counter terrorism information via Government/police-provided digital service

Participants were asked for any further comments or suggestions about how they might access counter terrorism information and work with local partners on counter terrorism issues in the future.

One of the key themes emerging from responses to this question was that participants see a combination of groups, meetings and forums as central to accessing information and working with local partners. Resilience forums were also mentioned as options. There were a range of other suggestions about the format of such meetings including:


- Meetings at a local, regional and national level could all play an important role
- Community Safety Partnerships
- Identification of Community Security Zones
- CONTEST Network/Board
- Need for events incorporating face to face meetings
- Laser groups
- Multi-agency/cross sectors
- Prevent Board and
- With counter terrorism officers and other agencies such as the police etc.

Working with local partners on counter terrorism issues in the future

Participants were asked whether they would access counter terrorism information through a new service that counter terrorism Policing are designing, in conjunction with Government and the Private Sector.

Almost four in five participants responding (1,822) said they would access counter terrorism information if the proposed service was available to them, while just over one in five (519) said they would not. When looking at this by those who own, operate, or are responsible for security at a Publicly Accessible Location, the proportion of those saying 'Yes' rises to over four in five (885 saying 'Yes' and 198 saying 'No'). The opposite can be said for those who do not own, operate or are responsible for security with less than three quarters saying 'Yes' (937 saying 'Yes' and 321 saying 'No').

Figure 4.2: Those who would access counter terrorism information if new service was available to them



Reasons for not wanting access to counter terrorism information service

Those who said they do not want to access counter terrorism information if the proposed service was available to them (519) cited a number of reasons for this. Some participants felt that the risk of terrorism offences was too low and not a threat at the moment, with some explicitly mentioning that the risk is lower in rural areas. Others stated that the risk of terrorism was too low compared to other problems while some stated that the low risk meant it is not good use of limited time to access counter terrorist information.

Some participants stated that the information is either not relevant to their role or their organisation. Others stated that, the size of their organisation was too small to concern themselves with counter terrorism information, there are a lack of resources to undertake this sort of information gathering, it is too onerous for volunteers (as there are no staff), or they simply do not need to access the information.

Publicly Accessible Location owners, operators, or those responsible for security at a Publicly Accessible Location who also stated they would access counter terrorism information (1,083) were most likely to use this service to get general updates on changing terrorism risk (735), to understand what risk management activities are required to be undertaken (709) and to access counter terrorism training (600).

Table 4.2: Reasons for using new counter terrorism information service

Q51. What would you most likely use this kind of service for?	Number of participants
To get general updates on how the terrorism risk is changing	735
To understand what risk management activities are required to be undertaken	709
To access counter terrorism training	600
Reporting of suspected terrorist activity/concerns	578
To understand what to do after an incident	530
To support business planning activities	515
To connect with other organisations to discuss counter terrorism	441

4.7 Role of private sector/business partnerships

Participants were asked about the role which local business partnerships should have in supporting organisations and venues to deliver improved security.

A total of 802 participants made comments in support of local business partnerships having a role in supporting organisations and venues to deliver improved security. There were 116 participants, on the other hand, who left opposing comments.


Table 4.3: Views on whether or not local business partnerships should have a role

Q53. What role should local business partnerships (such as Business Improvement Districts, Local Enterprise partnerships, etc.) have in supporting organisations and venues to deliver improved security?	Number of participants who support local business partnerships should have a role	Number of participants who oppose local business partnerships should have a role	Net support +/-
All who provided a response (961)	802	116	+686
Stakeholder (221)	184	23	+161
Non-Stakeholder (740)	618	93	+525

Government considerations to support counter terrorism advice and guidance

Participants were asked what Government should consider in order to support the provision of high-quality advice and guidance from private sector security professionals providing counter terrorism security advice. Participants could choose more than one response if they felt Government should have multiple considerations.

Figure 4.3: Government considerations to support counter terrorism advice and guidance



The most commonly selected option amongst participants was for the Government to consider implementing standards for counter terrorism risk assessments and advice, followed by accredited training for individual professionals, and regulation of counter terrorism consultants. A number of participants were also of the view that Government supported 'approved contractor schemes' would support the provisions of advice and guidance on counter terrorism.

4.8 Potential for Government incentives to encourage parties to take forward security considerations and measures

Participants were asked about the potential for the Government to incentivise improved security practices. Some of the responses to this question reiterated many of the key themes which had emerged elsewhere during the consultation.

- The provision of advice and information. The incentives identified included giving bespoke advice, collating information from 'experts' and other security partners (such as Counter Terrorism Security Advisers, police etc.), for advice to be clear and easy to understand and also easily accessible. The sharing of best practice was another commonly mentioned theme, as were incentives concerning the provision of advice and information
- Better engagement and communication. Participants identified a range of stakeholders which this should apply to, including Counter Terrorism Security Advisers, local authorities, local resilience forums, the police and associated trade organisations and
- Increased collaboration, co-ordination and joined up working. Participants mentioned a range of stakeholders who could work together, including the police, the security services, local authorities, the private sector and the Security Industry Authority.